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I.

INTRODUCTION

As the economy declined during the COVID-19 pandemic and many businesses
foundered, big technology companies experienced unprecedented growth and influence. 1 Despite
a crashing economy, “[t]he stocks of Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, Microsoft[,] and Facebook, the
five largest publicly traded companies in America, rose [thirty-seven] percent in the first seven
months [of 2020].”2 Those companies comprise around “[twenty] percent of the stock market’s
total worth.”3 This level of participation in the stock market is unprecedented given that no
industry has seen such success in seventy years or more.4 Explosive growth and market
participation begs the question: are these big technology companies attaining such enormous
milestones through monopolistic practices?5
Critics argue big technology companies are finding this level of success in-part due to
anticompetitive practices. 6 In her renowned article on the paradoxical intersection of Amazon
and antitrust law, antitrust advocate Lina M. Khan argued that Amazon has managed to dodge
antitrust inquiry by keeping prices low to benefit consumers while simultaneously undercutting

Peter Eavis & Steve Lohr, Big Tech’s Domination of Business Reaches New Heights, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/technology/big-tech-business-domination.html.
1

2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Anticompetitive Practices, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/anticompetitivepractices (last visited Mar. 31, 2022). Anticompetitive practices are those likely to lead to a reduction in
competition, higher prices, and less innovation and “include activities like price fixing, group boycotts,
and exclusionary exclusive dealing contracts or trade association rules . . . .” Id.
6

Eavis & Lohr, supra note 1. In 1929, A&P and Sears were responsible for three percent of retail sales,
which gave rise to antitrust laws in 1936 after Congress became concerned about their level of growth.
Currently, experts believe “Walmart and Amazon jointly account for [fifteen percent] of retail sales.” Id.
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smaller businesses, dominating the online retail market, and spreading its influence into a wide
range of fields—from credit lending to book publishing.7 Khan asserts that Amazon’s avoidance
of antitrust inquiry stems from a systemic problem within antitrust law as a whole—namely, the
principle that antitrust seeks primarily to prevent companies from becoming the sole source for a
product or service, which would raise prices, and harm consumers.8 Focusing on only price and
consumer welfare to analyze Amazon’s dominance “blinds us to the potential hazards” because
big tech companies are uniquely situated to keep prices low and benefit consumers while
simultaneously domineering marketplaces.9 Amazon has been, and will continue, amassing
structural influence which increasingly allows it to assert control over portions of the economy,
but the company will likely continue evading antitrust inquiry by exploiting the consumer
welfare standard—a hack to the antitrust system. 10 Though some find these claims radical, Khan
is not alone in demanding change for antitrust laws.11 In fact, her assertions bred so much
discussion that mainstream media brought the debate to the general public, and the Federal Trade

7

Lina M. Khan, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017). In addition to its prominence in
retail, Amazon has become “a marketing platform, a delivery and logistics network, a payment service, a
credit lender, an auction house, a major book publisher, a producer of television and films, a fashion
designer, a hardware manufacturer, and a leading provider of cloud server space and computing power.”
Id. at 713.
Id. The FTC seeks to prevent “unfair business practices” that are likely to reduce competition, quality, or
innovation and raise prices. Anticompetitive Practices, supra note 5.
8

Khan, supra note 7, at 717. Khan asserts that Amazon’s increasing dominance coincides with needed
changes in antitrust laws. Id. “Due to a change in legal thinking and practice in the 1970s and 1980s,
antitrust law now assesses competition largely with an eye to the short-term interests of consumers . . .
antitrust doctrine views low consumer prices, alone, to be evidence of sound competition.” Id. at 716.
9

Id.; see also David Streitfeld, Amazon’s Antitrust Antagonist has a Breakthrough Idea, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/technology/monopoly-antitrust-lina-khanamazon.html.
10

11

Streitfeld, supra note 10.
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Commission (FTC) hired Khan as a temporary adviser to assist in policy reformation
discussions.12 Khan’s viewpoint, and the viewpoint of those who agree with her, is called
“hipster antitrust” by antitrust practitioners and researchers.13
Despite hipster antitrust’s growing popularity, many voices in the legal community
counter that Amazon does not create an antitrust issue and should not be a concern. 14 Timothy J.
Murtis and Jonathan E. Nuechterlein compared Amazon to the A&P grocery store chain, which
the FTC targeted for antitrust inquiry in the 1900s and slowly eliminated from the marketplace. 15
“More than 80 years ago, the A&P grocery chain was a vertically integrated retailer that made
use of unprecedented scale and innovation to offer consumers a wider range of products than the
competition and at lower prices.”16 A&P’s great success harmed smaller competitors that were
less efficient and therefore could not keep their prices as low, triggered antitrust inquiry, and
eventually resulted in a “successful prosecution under the Sherman Act,” which pushed A&P
into irrelevance.17 Murtis and Nuechterlein compare the attacks on A&P to the attacks today

12

Id.

13

Kevin Yeh, Hipster Antitrust: A Brief Primer, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/tyl/topics/antitrust/hipster-antitrustbrief-primer/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).
14

Ashlyn Myers, Amazon Doesn't Have an Antitrust Problem: An Antitrust Analysis of Amazon's
Business Practices, 41 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 387 (2019); see also John Ceccio & Christopher Mufarrige,
Digital Platform Competition, Merger Control, and the Incentive to Innovate: Don't Kill the Goose that
Lays the Golden Egg, 30 COMPETITION: J. ANTITRUST UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SEC. CAL. L. ASSOC. 52
(2020).
15

Timothy J. Murtis & Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust in the Internet Era: The Legacy of United
States v. A&P, ANTONIN SCALIA L. SCH. J. OF L., ECON., & POLITICS (June 11, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3186569.
16

Id.

17

Id.

48

against big technology companies like Amazon. 18 The writers also assert that not only is Amazon
not anti-competitive—it is actually a pro-competitive business.19 The article concluded “antitrust
doctrine does not need an overhaul. It is shaped by many economic perspectives, follows no one
‘School,’ and is flexible enough to address any monopoly abuses in today’s economy.”20 This
mindset is popular, making the tension between traditional antitrust and hipster antitrust theory
increasingly contentious.
The crux of the debate rests on whether traditional antitrust laws are sufficient to cope
with big technology companies. Traditional antitrust theorists assert that they are sufficient.21
Hipster antitrust theorists distinguish companies like Amazon from trusts, which have previously
been regulated by antitrust laws, arguing that because of these differences current laws cannot
adequately regulate modern big tech companies. 22 This article concludes that big tech companies
are distinguishable from the firms antitrust laws were designed to mitigate because their business
models allow them to attain monopoly status, domineer marketplaces, and undercut competitors
while simultaneously catering to consumer welfare. This is possible in part because, unlike firms
like A&P and Microsoft (during the 1990s), modern day technology companies can make

Id. Beginning with A&P, expanding to “big box” stores, and now to online retailers like Amazon,
retailers over the past several decades have lowered prices and increased convenience, challenging
“traditional retail models.” Id.
18

Id. “Procompetitive” businesses occur when a firm provides a competitive force to drive other firms
into collaboration with more businesses to create a thriving marketplace. Dealings with Competitors, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/dealingscompetitors (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).
19

Murtis & Nuechterlein, supra note 15. The writers added that current antitrust laws are “wellcalibrated” to serve its central goal, promoting consumer welfare. Id. While the writers concede that
antitrust is still a work in progress, they maintained, “it is far superior to any alternative the critics
propose.” Id.
20

21

Id.

22

Khan, supra note 7.
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income from other sources than consumers.23 Alternative sources of income include selling user
data to third parties 24 and advertising on web and app-based platforms.25 In other words, the
consumers themselves are the money-makers, so it is entirely feasible to keep costs to consumers
low while still achieving a monopoly undercutting smaller businesses.26 Firms from the late
1800s and early 1900s did not have access to these methods.
This article will focus on two of the multiple companies that became targets of antitrust
inquiry in 2020: Oracle and Amazon. This article will analyze each company under three
potential frameworks for antitrust inquiry—traditional antitrust theory, hipster antitrust theory,
and a proposed alternative solution—to assess whether they would violate antitrust laws through
the lens of each proposal.
This article agrees with Khan that the focus on consumer welfare as the bar for improper
conduct since the 1970s is inherently flawed in today’s online marketplace, and the FTC should
focus more on predatory pricing; however, Khan’s extreme proposal of a change from traditional
antitrust theory is likely not warranted. 27 Rather, this article suggests an adaptation of today’s
laws to focus not only on consumer welfare but also on the welfare of small businesses within
the marketplace in addition to consumer welfare. The United States has always been a champion
of small businesses, and taking action to prevent big tech companies from squashing out “mom

23

See Khan, supra note 7.

24

William Poundstone, How Do Tech Companies Make Money from Our Personal Data? FORBES (June
27, 2019, 11:20 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2019/06/27/how-do-tech-companies-makemoney-from-our-personal-data/.
25

How the Big Five Tech Companies Make Money, Visualized, DIGG (June 10, 2019, 9:15 AM)
https://digg.com/2019/tech-companies-main-revenue-stream-data-visualization.
26

See Khan, supra note 7 (analyzing Amazon).

27

Id.

50

and pop” establishments like local bookstores and restaurants will serve to further the American
ideal of a free marketplace where any business can succeed. This shift will encourage the FTC to
consider how the monopolistic actions of these massive companies impact the small businesses
forced to work with and through them. This article also suggests developing a greater focus on
predatory pricing and, rather than only occasionally examining such issues, lowering the bar so
the FTC can preemptively examine pricing tactics that may result in harm to consumers. 28 If the
FTC simultaneously considered consumer welfare and the welfare of small businesses while
adjusting the definition of and preemptively reviewing predatory pricing tactics, big tech
companies like Amazon and Oracle could continue to assert their influence and be competitive in
the marketplace while still allowing potential competitors to thrive.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ANTITRUST LAW

In the 1800s, there were several huge businesses called “trusts” which asserted control
over entire sections of the economy, including steel, railroads, oil, and sugar. 29 “Two of the most
famous trusts were U.S. Steel and Standard Oil; they were monopolies that controlled the supply
of their product—as well as the price.”30 Because single companies were puppeteering entire
industries, there was no competition, and consumers thereby had no choice whom to buy from. 31
Increased prices and low quality “caused hardship and threatened the new American

28

See Anticompetitive Practices, supra note 5 (explaining anticompetitive practices).

FTC Fact Sheet: Antitrust Laws: A Brief History, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/games/off-site/youarehere/pages/pdf/FTCCompetition_Antitrust-Laws.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).
29

30

Id.

31

Id.

51

prosperity.”32 President Theodore Roosevelt created what later became antitrust laws and broke
up many trusts, promoting competition and protecting consumers in the marketplace. 33
Congress passed several laws to outlaw unfair competition, including The Sherman Act,
The Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act.34 Congress passed the Sherman Act in
1890 and declared it illegal for competitors to come to agreements with each other—placing
limits on competition.35 The Clayton Act, which Congress passed in 1914, supplemented the
Sherman Act by preventing companies from merging to control production and pricing within
their industries—as some companies were doing as a way to form a trust without actually
forming a trust.36 Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914 to create the
Federal Trade Commission and tasked the agency with watching for unfair business practices;
Congress also gave the agency authority to investigate companies and enforce antitrust laws to
stop deceptive practices and unfair competition.37
The “Golden Era” of antitrust took place from the 1940s until the late 1970s.38 After
Congress passed the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts, 1900 until 1920 ushered in

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Id. The Sherman Act outlawed price-fixing and made it illegal for businesses to maintain monopoly
status through cheating or unfair competition. Id.
36

Id. Such mergers and acquisitions may stifle competition. Id.

37

Id.

38

Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of the U.S. Antitrust Movement, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/12/the-rise-fall-and-rebirth-of-the-u-s-antitrustmovement.

52

antitrust action to prevent trusts and monopolies from forming. 39 Then, through the 1920s and
30s, antitrust action diminished as the New Deal and a focus on industry-government
cooperation yielded a deemphasis on antitrust enforcement. 40 The lull did not last long. From the
1940s through the late 1970s, the FTC saw competition as an “antidote to fascism, and antitrust
as the enabler of that competition.”41 Thus, during the “Golden Age” of antitrust, “antitrust
policy was a central condition necessary for effective competition.” 42 Applying the laws enacted
only a few decades before, the Department of Justice civilly and criminally prosecuted
monopolistic abuses and unfair business practices. 43 Europe and Japan adopted this approach
after World War Two. 44
The late 1970s arrived and brought with it the Chicago School of Economics and its
belief in self-correcting markets—causing antitrust enforcement to wane. 45 “The government
rarely challenged mergers among competitors. Challenges of vertical mergers were even rarer,
with the last one litigated in 1979.”46 The gap between antitrust enforcement and public concern

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Id. With fascism spreading throughout Europe, the Middle East, and much of Asia and Africa, the
United States perceived the “competition ideal” as under attack. Id. The competition ideal expressed the
belief that dispersal of economic power to the many rather than the hands of a few would foster more
opportunities to compete and improve. Id.
42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.

Id. “By the Obama administration, we had neither a popular antitrust movement nor many significant
antitrust prosecutions.” Id.
46

53

broadened as antitrust law became increasingly complicated, the FTC abandoned their original
noneconomic goals in favor of a “consumer welfare” standard.47 Antitrust concerns faded due to
the widespread belief that “there was no need for robust antitrust enforcement to create or
maintain the conditions necessary to make competition effective” because market forces would
naturally resolve issues of market power. 48
Recently, a group of young scholars investigating whether there have been actual benefits
from allowing antitrust regulation-free competition have spurred on “an emerging progressive,
anti-monopoly” belief system.49 These scholars warn that meager competition is not benefitting
consumers, arguing that the current competition laws are beneficial to few at the expense of the
majority.50 This new school’s primary focus is on innovation, investment, and avoidance of
chilling competition—the question is the degree to which the FTC should promote
enforcement.51
III.

ANTITRUST: TRADITIONAL ANTITRUST THEORY, HIPSTER
ANTITRUST THEORY, AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION
a. TRADITIONAL ANTITRUST THEORY

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the administrative agency dedicated to antitrust
regulation and enforcement.52 The agency specifically regulates anticompetitive practices such as
47

Id.

48

Id. And, supposedly, far better than government intervention.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

Anticompetitive Practices, supra note 5. “The FTC takes action to stop and prevent unfair business
practices that are likely to reduce competition and lead to higher prices, reduced quality or levels of
service, or less innovation.” Id.
52

54

group boycotts, price fixing, and “exclusionary exclusive dealing contracts or trade association
rules.”53 There are two types of unfair competition according to the FTC: “Horizontal Conduct,”
which refers to agreements between competitors in a way that limits competition, and “single
firm conduct,” which refers to monopolization by excluding competitors and blocking potential
competitors from entering the marketplace. 54 This article is concerned primarily with single firm
conduct.
Section two of the Sherman Act prohibits companies from monopolizing or attempting to
monopolize commerce or trade. 55 “As that law has been interpreted, it is not illegal for a
company to have a monopoly, to charge ‘high prices,’ or to try to achieve a monopoly position
by what might be viewed by some as particularly aggressive methods.”56 Rather, firms only
violate the law if they employ unreasonable methods in maintaining or acquiring a monopoly; or
to achieve such a position through particularly aggressive measures. 57
When evaluating a monopoly, the FTC begins with a two-step inquiry: first, it asks
whether the firm has “monopoly power” in a marketplace, which “requires [an] in-depth study of
the products sold by the leading firm,” as well as alternative sources of products, which

53

Id.

54

Id.

Single Firm Conduct, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).
55

56

Id.

Id. “A key factor in determining what is unreasonable is whether the practice has a legitimate business
justification.” Id.
57

55

consumers would use if the dominant company raised prices; second, it investigates whether a
company used improper conduct to attain a leading position. 58
To assess whether a company qualifies as a monopoly, courts apply the rules for single
firm conduct and, even if a company has not become a literal monopoly, the FTC may regulate
the firm as long as the firm has “significant and durable market power,” or “the long term ability
to raise price or exclude competitors.”59 Often, courts will not find monopoly power unless more
than fifty percent of product or service sales in a single geographic area are made by the firm or
“group of firms acting in concert.”60 Further, this monopolizing position “must be sustainable
over time” such that no new firms could enter and “discipline the conduct of the leading firm.” 61
Regulators must then evaluate whether the firm used improper conduct to attain its level
of success.62 Improper conduct refers to conduct other than producing a superior product,
operating with better management, or participating in a “historic accident.” 63 Evaluating
monopolistic conduct requires an in-depth analysis of both the marketplace and the method
engaged to achieve and maintain a monopoly. 64 “Obtaining a monopoly by superior products,
innovation, or business acumen is legal; however, the same result achieved by exclusionary or

Monopolization Defined, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/monopolization-defined (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).
58

59

Id. “Monopolists” are firms who hold “significant and durable market power.” Id.

60

Id. Some courts have required even higher percentages. Further, the position of power must be
sustainable such that if new, competitive firms could enter the market and control the leading firm the
courts would not find the firm to be a monopoly. Id.
61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

56

predatory acts may raise antitrust concerns.”65 Such tactics may involve tying, predatory pricing,
exclusive supply or purchase agreements, and refusal to deal. 66 A monopolist may prevent other
businesses from succeeding in the marketplace through legitimate business actions; examples
include presenting unique products and services in a way that benefits consumers or promoting
greater efficiency. 67 Courts must ultimately determine whether the monopolist’s success is the
result of anticompetitive practices as opposed to the natural growth and development which
comes from “a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” 68
As an example of unfair business practices, the FTC cited a 1999 case in which
“Microsoft was found to have a monopoly over operating systems software for IBM-compatible
personal computers.”69 Through their dominant industry position, Microsoft was actively
excluding other computer manufacturers from “installing [any] non-Microsoft browser software”
on Microsoft’s operating system software. 70 In this case, the court found that Microsoft
prevented “rivals from using the lowest-cost means of taking market share away from
Microsoft.”71 In order to settle the case, Microsoft committed to end “certain conduct that was
preventing the development of competing browser software.” 72

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id.

Id. Microsoft deliberately included Internet Explorer (Microsoft’s browser system) on every Windows
operating system sold to computer makers and made it difficult to use any non-Microsoft browsers. Id.
The company also discouraged development of add-on software for non-Microsoft browsers. Id.
70

71

Id.

72

Id.

57

What if a company formed a monopoly and did so through unfair business practices, yet
kept prices low? Is it possible for prices to be too low? “The short answer is yes, but not very
often. Generally, low prices benefit consumers. Consumers are harmed only if below-cost
pricing allows a dominant competitor to knock its rivals out of the market and then raise prices to
above-market levels for a substantial time.”73 A company’s decision to keep prices at a level
below its expenses does not harm competition, but rather may be an example of a thriving and
vigorous marketplace.74 Although the FTC reviews predatory price claims carefully, courts are
generally very skeptical. 75 Some experts fear Amazon is engaging in pre-predatory pricing
behaviors by keeping prices low for consumers in order to knock competitors out of the
marketplace.76 The company has maintained low costs and hemorrhaged money for many years
and, as a result, has grown expansively; and they have not yet raised their prices for consumers. 77
However, critics fear the company will eventually use its influence to raise prices once
competitors are out of the picture. 78
One of the most unsettled concepts in antitrust law involves the duty of firms to deal with
competitors: refusal to deal may be considered an unfair business practice, but firms generally do

Predatory or Below-Cost Pricing, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/predatory-or-below-cost (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).
73

Id. “Instances of a large firm using low prices to drive smaller competitors out of the market in hopes of
raising prices after they leave are rare,” Id.
74

75

Id.

76

See generally Khan, supra note 7.

77

Id.

78

Id.

58

not have any duty to deal with their competitors. 79 Nonetheless, courts have found that there is
sometimes an antitrust violation when a firm with substantial market power declines to do
business or negotiate with a competitor.80 This area of the law is continuing to develop. 81
Under traditional antitrust theory, it is unlikely either Amazon or Oracle would be
considered monopolies engaging in improper business practices.
b. HIPSTER ANTITRUST THEORY
In early 2017, Lina M. Khan published Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox in the Yale Law
Journal, and her article began an insurgence against the recognized consensus within antitrust
circles that had existed since the 1970s.82 This article kickstarted the “hipster antitrust”
movement, which advocates that the current system of measuring competition, which does so
through companies’ price and output, causes incomprehensible harm to America’s competitive
marketplace.83 Hipster antitrust doctrine argues for a greater appreciation of predatory pricing
risks and a better understanding of “how integration across distinct business lines may prove
anticompetitive.”84 According to Khan, online platforms are of particular concern because (1)
“the economics of platform markets create incentives for a company to pursue growth over

Refusal to Deal, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guideantitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/refusal-deal (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).
79

Id. For example, “if the monopolist refuses to sell a product or service to a competitor that it makes
available to others, or if the monopolist has done business with the competitor and then stops, the
monopolist needs a legitimate business reason for its policies.” Id.
80

81

Id.

82

See Streitfeld, supra note 10. Notably, the 1970s marked the shift in antitrust regulation to focus on
consumer welfare (i.e. price). Id. According to Khan, this theory has allowed Amazon to evade federal
intervention because it is famous for its cut-rate pricing system. Id.
83

Khan, supra note 7.

84

Id. at 710.

59

profits,” and (2) online platforms integrate between businesses through serving as critical
intermediaries, which allows them to create and control a central infrastructure which rivals
depend on.85
Khan and other hipster antitrust theorists suggest two potential alternative antitrust
regimes to the current theories: (1) return to traditional antitrust principles from prior to the
1970s to prevent the emergence of dominance, limit the scope of such dominance, or both, or (2)
adopt regulations neutering a firm’s ability to exploit its superior position, which some firms do
by taking advantage of economies of scale through “applying common carrier obligations and
duties.”86 According to Khan, the “key is deciding whether we want to govern online platform
markets through competition, or want to accept that they are inherently monopolistic or
oligopolistic and regulate them instead.”87
Under the first suggestion, Khan argues for revising FTC predatory pricing regulations to
be more “robust” and to more strongly monitor and police the types of vertical integration firms
could employ to anticompetitive ends.88 Although predatory pricing is still illegal, “courts now
require proof that the alleged predator would be able to raise prices and recoup its losses[,]”
making it exceedingly difficult to succeed on predatory pricing claims.89 Platform markets like
Amazon currently allow investors to back firms such that the firms can hemorrhage money for

85

Id.

86

Id. at 717.

87

Id. at 790.

Id. “Importantly, each of these doctrinal areas should be reformulated so that it is sensitive to
preserving the competitive process and limiting conflicts of interest that may incentivize anticompetitive
conduct.” Id. at 791.
88

89

Id.

60

years without failing; as a result, predatory pricing does not become a problem until well after
the monopoly has been established. 90 First, the predatory pricing doctrine must abandon the
recoupment requirement91 in cases involving platform markets.92 Second, the FTC must
introduce a competition based approach to create a “presumption of predation for dominant
platforms found to be pricing products below cost.” 93 To address the issue of vertical integration
giving rise to anticompetitive conflicts of interest, Khan suggests scrutinizing mergers to prevent
firms from acquiring “valuable data and cross-leverag[ing] it”94 or, alternatively, “introducing a
prophylactic ban on mergers that would give rise to conflicts of interest.” 95
Under the second suggestion, Khan recommends regulating the dominant platforms as
monopolies by limiting how the monopoly may use its power in exchange for accepting the
benefits of being a monopoly, as is often the model for public utility regulations and common

90

Id.

91

Id. at 729–30. Recoupment has been at the center of predatory pricing requirements since Brooke
Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. was decided by the Supreme Court in 1993. Id. at 729.
“Today, succeeding on a predatory pricing claim requires a plaintiff to meet the Brooke Group
recoupment test by showing that the defendant would be able to recoup its losses through sustaining
supercompetitive prices.” Id.
92

Id.

Id. at 791. “Introducing a presumption of predation would involve identifying when a price is below
cost, a subject of much debate.” Id. Khan did not take a position on the correct metric for identifying
below-cost pricing. Id.
93

Id. at 792. “Under this regime, Facebook's purchases of WhatsApp and Instagram, for instance, would
have received greater scrutiny from the antitrust agencies, in recognition of how acquiring data can deeply
implicate competition.” Id. at 792–93.
94

95

Id. at 792. Prophylactic limits on the vertical integration of platform markets would be a stricter
approach, preventing businesses from direct competition with those businesses dependent on the market
platform. Id. at 793. “In the case of Amazon, for example, this prophylactic approach would prohibit the
company from running both a dominant retail platform and a dominant platform for third-party sellers.”
Id. at 793–94.
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carrier duties.96 As Amazon serves as a form of “essential infrastructure across the internet
economy,” the elements of public utility regulations could be applied: “(1) requiring
nondiscrimination in price and service, (2) setting limits on rate-setting, and (3) imposing
capitalization and investment requirements.” 97
To narrow down which solution would be best, Khan suggested determining whether the
goal was to promote competition through governance of online platform markets, or “accept that
they are inherently monopolistic” and take a regulatory approach instead. 98 Khan ultimately
suggests that if “we accept dominant online platforms as natural monopolies or oligopolies, then
applying elements of a public utility regime or essential facilities obligations would maintain the
benefits of scale while limiting the ability of dominant platforms to abuse the power that comes
with it.”99
Khan is not alone in advocating for “hipster antitrust” and favoring placing stronger
regulations on big technology companies like Amazon.100 The FTC itself is actively considering

96

Id. at 797. Industries which historically are regulated as utilities include commodities like water and
electric power, transportation (e.g. railroads), and communications (e.g. telephones). Id.
97

Id. at 798. Khan added that nondiscrimination would make the most sense to implement, while the
others would be both difficult and not directly address the deficiency. Id.
98

Id. at 790. Taking the former approach would call for reforming current antitrust laws to limit the scope
of market dominance, while taking the latter approach would require diminishing these large business’s
ability to exploit their dominance while still taking advantage of their benefits. Id.
Id. at 803. “In order to capture these anticompetitive concerns, we should replace the consumer welfare
framework with an approach oriented around preserving a competitive process and market structure.” Id.
99

Streitfield, supra note 9. After publishing her article, Khan “abruptly went from an outsider proposing
reform to an insider formulating policy. Rohit Chopra, a new Democratic commissioner at the FTC,
pulled her in as a temporary adviser in July [of 2018], at a time when urgent questions about privacy,
data, competition and antitrust were suddenly in the air.” Id.
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whether to tighten or further enforce antitrust regulations101 against these companies, and even
the House Judiciary Committee Antitrust Subcommittee became involved in antitrust regulation
in 2020.102 In February 2020, the FTC “ordered Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Alphabet and
Microsoft to turn over a decade’s worth of information on small acquisitions.” 103 By requesting
the information on hundreds of small deals these companies made over the last ten years, the
FTC hopes it will discover any previously unreported antitrust abuses, given that these big tech
companies have successfully acquired dozens of small tech companies worth less than one
hundred million dollars over the years. 104 Particularly, this tactic examines whether these
acquisitions qualify as “killer acquisitions” utilized to choke off competition; “[u]nder that
strategy, the large tech companies buy a nascent competitor to protect their dominance and
prevent the smaller company from growing into a bigger threat.” 105 On October 20, 2020, the
Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against Google for illegally maintaining a monopoly over
both online searching and search advertising by “throttling competition through exclusive
business contracts and agreements.”106
101

Cecilia Kang & David McCabe, F.T.C. Broadens Review of Tech Giants, Homing In on Their Deals,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/11/technology/ftc-tech-giantsacquisitions.html.
Cecilia Kang & David McCabe, Lawmakers, United in Their Ire, Lash Out at Big Tech’s Leaders,
N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/technology/big-tech-hearing-appleamazon-facebook-google.html. “The chiefs of Amazon, Apple, Google[,] and Facebook faced withering
questions from Democrats about anti-competitive practices and from Republicans about anti-conservative
bias” in July at hearings focused on evaluating these companies’ market dominance and tactics in
achieving such astounding success. Id.
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Kang, supra note 101.
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Id.
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Id.
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Cecilia Kang, David McCabe, & Daisuke Wakabayashi, U.S. Accuses Google of Illegally Protecting
Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2020, 6:46 PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/20/technology/google-antitrust.html. This lawsuit is the government’s
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Under the hipster antitrust framework, Amazon would be considered a monopoly
employing improper business practices,107 but likely not Oracle.108
c. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
My proposed solution has two components. First, I agree with Khan that the focus on
consumer welfare, which has been the bar for improper conduct since the 1970s, is inherently
flawed in today’s online marketplace and we should place more focus on predatory pricing;
however, we should perhaps not make as extreme a change from traditional antitrust theory as
Khan proposes.109 Rather, I suggest that today’s laws adapt to focus on consumer and small
business welfare within the marketplace.110 This shift in perspective will consider how these
companies’ monopolistic actions impact the small businesses who are forced to work with and
through them. Second, I suggest focusing more on, and lowering the bar for, predatory pricing so
the FTC can examine pricing tactics preemptively and address them before they harm the
market.111 By simultaneously considering consumer and small business welfare while adjusting
most notable challenge to a big technology company’s market power in a generation. Id. Such a lawsuit
may kickstart a “cascade of other antitrust lawsuits from state attorneys general.” Id.
107

Khan, supra note 7, at 805.
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Jordan Novet, Oracle Is a Distant Laggard in Cloud Infrastructure Market Even After TikTok Deal,
CNBC (Sept. 22, 2020, 7:39 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/22/oracle-remains-laggard-in-cloudinfrastructure-even-after-tiktok-deal.html. “Oracle’s market share sits at around 2%, based on data from
Gartner, Synergy Research Group and Canalys, and ranks no higher than sixth globally.” Id.
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See Monopolization Defined, supra note 58 (explaining predatory pricing); see also Khan, supra note 7
(elaborating on Khan’s proposed theory).
See Anti-Dumping: The Basics, EUR. COMM’N (Feb. 20, 2006),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_06_85. This principle is well-established
in European “anti-dumping” principles, which refer to the practice of selling products at less than their
normal value to put competitors out of business. Id.
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111

Id. The European anti-dumping principles allow the government to investigate predatory pricing
practices before companies hike their prices, focusing instead on how the low prices impact other
businesses. Id.
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the definition of, and preemptively reviewing, predatory pricing tactics, 112 the FTC would allow
big tech companies like Amazon and Oracle to continue to assert their influence and be
competitive while also allowing potential competitors to thrive.
The FTC created the consumer welfare bar for antitrust inquiry in the 1970s, to allow
large companies to expand as long as their expansion was beneficial to consumers. 113 This
standard has become antiquated, however, as the move to online marketplaces has allowed
substantial price cutting while simultaneously offering more, higher quality products as increased
quantity of excellent products is possible through low cost of business and ease of expansion. 114
By focusing entirely on the present day impact on consumers at the exclusion of other companies
(especially small businesses), this standard could allow companies like Amazon, Microsoft, and
Google to eliminate competitors and become the only option for consumers. 115 At which point
Amazon, Microsoft, and Google could easily raise prices and leave consumers with no option but
to pay.116 Thus, this article advises against a reactionary approach that waits for inevitable
problems to arise and instead suggests preemptively addressing these anticompetitive practices
by focusing on the way those practices currently impact competitors and small businesses.
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The idea that predatory pricing laws should regulate companies keeping prices low to drive out
competitors who have not yet raised prices is not novel; in fact, the World Trade Organization passed an
act prohibiting predatory dumping (also known as predatory pricing) in 1916. United States – AntiDumping Act of 1916, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 31, 2000),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/7542d.pdf. Anti-dumping rules regulating predatory
dumping have become increasingly restrictive internationally. Id.
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See Streitfeld, supra note 10 (explaining that the 1970s marked the shift in antitrust regulation to focus
on consumer welfare).
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See Khan, supra note 7.
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See id.
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See id.
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Particularly for a company like Amazon, which runs an online marketplace for which it is
both the operator and a retailer, it is easy to sell goods for less money while expanding its reach
into all corners of the retail space. 117 Amazon has grown to dominate in a wide variety of
industries and, as both the marketplace host and a retailer, it has the power to force small
businesses to sell on its platform and can then undercut the small businesses on prices for the
same products.118 Although the low prices benefit consumers now, will they in the long run?
This article asserts they will not because Amazon will undercut small businesses and make it all
but impossible for them to earn a profit. These practices give Amazon far too much industry
control, and over time use of such practices has slowly led to the elimination or acquisition of
direct competitors.119
Similarly, altering the predatory pricing definition and investigatory practices is
warranted because the current practices are reactive rather than proactive and are rarely
employed.120 Predatory pricing currently regulates companies which keep prices low to squash
competition and then raise prices substantially once competitors have been eliminated. 121 This is
rarely reviewed by the FTC or the Department of Justice (DOJ), in part because companies have
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See id.; see also Dana Mattioli, Amazon Accused of Using Monopoly Power as E-Commerce
‘Gatekeeper’, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 7, 2020, 11:22 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazonaccused-of-using-monopoly-power-in-rise-as-e-commerce-gatekeeper-11602084168.
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See Khan, supra note 7, at 768; see also Streitfeld, supra note 10; cf. Myers, supra note 14.
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See Predatory or Below-Cost Pricing, supra note 73 (defining existing predatory pricing laws).
“Instances of a large firm using low prices to drive smaller competitors out of the market in hopes of
raising prices after they leave are rare.” Id.; see generally Khan, supra note 6 (explaining why predatory
pricing doctrine in the United States is reactionary rather than proactive).
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Predatory or Below-Cost Pricing, supra note 73.
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to actually raise prices for the purpose of eliminating competition in order to be investigated. 122
However, this is a flawed system because once the competitors have been undercut and the
prices have been raised the harm has already been done.123 Rather than waiting for the harm to
occur, the investigation into predatory pricing tactics should take place when companies are
actively keeping prices low to gain an advantage and eliminate competitors. 124
The FTC and DOJ should begin an investigation of a company as soon as they detect
predatory pricing. Predatory pricing alone would not be enough to justify antitrust enforcement;
rather, once the FTC has detected predatory pricing they should conduct a full investigation into
the company and its business practices.125 If the company qualifies as a monopoly, is engaging in
predatory pricing, and is creating harm to small businesses, then the FTC should enforce antitrust
regulations and the company should be forced to eliminate its anticompetitive practices. 126
IV.

ABOUT ORACLE AND AMAZON
a. AMAZON

Amazon has four core principles: “customer obsession rather than competitor focus,
passion for invention, commitment to operational excellence, and long-term thinking.”127
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See id.
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See generally Khan, supra note 7.
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See Anti-Dumping: The Basics, supra note 110.

Id. (explaining the World Trade Organization version of predatory pricing). “It is only possible to
categorically identify dumping by undertaking a detailed analysis of the conditions in which exports are
produced.” Id.
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See generally Monopolization Defined, supra note 58 (explaining requirements to qualify as a
monopoly); Predatory or Below-Cost Pricing, supra note 73 (defining predatory pricing); Anti-Dumping:
The Basics, supra note 110 (explaining European predatory pricing doctrine).
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Who We Are, AMAZON, https://www.aboutamazon.com/about-us (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).
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Amazon claims to focus on customers and to be a champion of small businesses, 128 but does the
tech giant really prioritize customers and small businesses?
Lina M. Khan would say no. Rather than a goal of championing consumers and small
businesses, Khan argues Amazon’s strategy has allowed the company to avoid antitrust inquiry
through “fervently devoting its business strategy and rhetoric to reducing prices for
consumers.”129 Some call Khan a radical, but her critiques ring true with a far wider audience. 130
In summer of 2020, the Senate held several hearings to interrogate Amazon, along with several
other major tech companies, to see whether Amazon and businesses like it engage in
anticompetitive business practices.131 Though the hearings had little result, they have fueled
investigations into the tech companies by administrative agencies, including the Justice
Department, the Federal Trade Commission, and the state attorneys general.132 In early 2020, the
FTC independently “ordered Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Alphabet and Microsoft to turn over a
decade’s worth of information on small acquisitions” to assess whether the companies were

128

Id.

Khan, supra note 7, at 716. “It is as if Bezos charted the company’s growth by first drawing a map of
antitrust laws, and then devising routes to smoothly bypass them.” Id.
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See Streitfeld, supra note 10.
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Kang & McCabe, supra note 101. Apple, Amazon, Facebook, and Google responded to questioning
from both Democratic and Republican lawmakers over anti-competitive practices in July of 2020. Id. The
tech companies faced “withering questions” over the “market dominance” they have attained and the
tactics they employed to reach their superior positions. Id.
Id. “When lawmakers asked Mr. Bezos if Amazon had bullied small merchants, he said that it was ‘not
how we operate the business’—before being confronted by an audio recording of a bookseller begging
him directly for relief.” Id.
132

68

engaging in antitrust abuses. 133 When confronted with these criticisms, Amazon says “it
welcomes regulatory scrutiny.”134
From the beginning, Amazon’s strategy has touted patience. 135 In an interview with
Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos, Harvard Business Review reported that Bezos’ strategy centers around
planting seeds and being willing to wait patiently for the seeds to grow into trees. 136 In 1997,
Bezos developed his philosophy against focusing on competition when his staff became fearful
of Barnes & Noble squashing Amazon out of existence as a book seller.137 Bezos told his
employees, “Yes, you should wake up every morning terrified with your sheets drenched in
sweat, but not because you’re afraid of our competitors. Be afraid of our customers, because
those are the folks who have the money.” 138
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Kang & McCabe, supra note 102. The FTC claims it requested information on acquisitions of dozens
of small technology firms throughout the past decade. Law does not require this information to be
reported to regulators and may, therefore, provide insight into potential antitrust abuses. Id. Specifically,
the FTC was looking into “killer acquisitions,” which is a strategy used to “choke off competition”
through buying nascent competitors in order to prevent them “from growing into a bigger threat.” Id.
Mattioli, supra note 117. In a blog post, Amazon addressed the Congressional report from July’s
criticism by saying, “All large organizations attract the attention of regulators, and we welcome that
scrutiny. But large companies are not dominant by definition, and the presumption that success can only
be the result of anti-competitive behavior is simply wrong.” Id.
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Julia Kirby and Thomas A. Stewart, The Institutional Yes, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2007),
https://hbr.org/2007/10/the-institutional-yes.
Id. Bezos explained that they do not always know when a seed they’ve planted will turn into an oak,
but they know it could turn into something that big. Id. They pick the courses of action where they can
say, “if we can get this to work, it will be big.” Id. Bezos claims it takes five to seven years for a planted
seed to become beneficial economically for the company, in general. Id.
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Id.
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Id. Bezos claims that from that time on, Amazon has made decisions for the benefit of customers such
as free shipping, Amazon Prime, and constantly lowering prices. Id. Critics, analysts, and journalists
questioned all of these decisions, and through each instance where it worked, Amazon gained credibility.
Id.
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When Jeff Bezos conceptualized Amazon.com in 1994, he chose the name Amazon
“because it began with the first letter of the alphabet and because of its association with the vast
South American river.”139 From his research, Bezos concluded the most logical product for
online retail was initially books.140 Amazon, which became available on the World Wide Web in
July of 1995, kicked off by offering to the public 24/7 shopping 365 days per year and an
unprecedented book selection. 141 By 1998, the company had expanded to offer music, video, and
gifts, all available for one-click shopping with lowered prices. 142 Each year thereafter, Amazon
expanded its product lines to offer more and more products.143 In 2002, Amazon created Amazon
Web Services to function as server space. 144 By 2005, Amazon had created Amazon Prime to
offer unprecedented express shipping for $79 per year.145 Today, even Amazon’s rivals, like
Netflix, use Amazon Web Services as cloud server space for their “competing video streaming
service.”146
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Mark Hall, Amazon.com, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Amazoncom (last visited
Mar. 31, 2022).
Id. “Amazon.com was not the first company to do so,” but Amazon’s promise “was to deliver any
book to any reader anywhere.” Id.
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Kirby and Stewart, supra note 135.
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Id. At that point, Amazon had also partnered with major traffic aggregates like Yahoo and AOL and
expanded to markets in the United Kingdom and Germany. Id.
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Id. By 2000, Amazon had expanded its offerings to include consumer electronics, toys, videogames,
software, cars, kitchen supplies, health and beauty aids, and more. Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Hall, supra note 139. In 2006, Amazon added the Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) to their AWS
portfolio, “which rents out computer processing power.” Id. In the same year, Amazon released Simple
Storage Service (S3) to lease data storage via the internet. Id. Netflix employs both S3 and EC2 for video
streaming. Id.
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Amazon continues to expand into more markets with each passing year. In 2017, Amazon
entered the grocery store market when it purchased Whole Foods.147 This foray into food retail
expanded further in 2020 when Amazon opened the Amazon Fresh grocery store employing the
Alexa virtual-assistant technology to “help customers manage shopping lists and navigate aisles”
and the “Go” technology to allow customers to shop checkout-free.148 The company also recently
“rolled out Amazon Halo, a health and wellness tracker that the company said also tracks its
users’ emotions.”149 Further, in 2020 Amazon unveiled a new home drone security system
involving an in-home drone with a camera which flies around and monitors activity within the
owner’s home.150 Amazon recently put out a cloud-gaming service called “Luna” to allow users
to “stream videogames over the internet” using mobile devices, computers, or the Fire TV at the
initial cost of $5.99 per month. 151 In 2020, Amazon created a multifunctional oven incorporating
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Id.
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Dave Sebastian, Amazon Rolls Out Halo, a Wellness Tracker That It Says Can Also Sense Moods,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-rolls-out-halo-a-wellness-trackerthat-it-says-can-also-sense-moods-11598543692.
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Id. The wristband and associated app monitor sleep, body fat percentage, heart rate, activity, and the
users’ social and emotional well-being. Id. Additionally, the product’s battery defeats other wearable
technologies, as the battery charge for the device lasts up to seven days and may be fully recharged within
ninety minutes. Id. The price of the Amazon Halo is also competitive; the Halo Band and a six-month
membership initially costs $64.99 and automatically renews for $3.99 per month after the first six months
after purchase. Id. For comparison, FitBits start at $69.95, and the Apple Watch retails for $399 or more.
Id.
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Sebastian Herrera, Amazon Event: Tech Titan Unveils New Home Drone, Speakers, Gaming Service,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-expected-to-unveil-more-alexasmart-home-devices-11600945201. The security system also includes car alarms and a car camera. Id.
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Id. The subscription provides a library of fifty games and users may spend $50 to purchase an
associated custom controller. Id.
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the “Alexa” technology and doubling as a motion sensor, microwave, earbuds, and air fryer. 152
Indeed, “there are few consumer categories in which Amazon is absent.” 153
b. ORACLE
Oracle, a cloud computing company, provides an infrastructure platform for other
enterprises in need of “higher performance computing” and a complete suite of integrated cloud
applications to help businesses streamline their processes.154 Oracle works in a wide variety of
industries, including communications, healthcare, hospitality, banking, insurance, life sciences,
retail, and more.155 Oracle has also increasingly entered the big data, data science, and artificial
intelligence fields, 156 where they provide artificial intelligence157 and data science services to
gather information and assist clients through promotion of data-driven business.158
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See Oracle Cloud Infrastructure, ORACLE,
https://www.oracle.com/index.html&source=:so:tw:pay::rc_emmk190514p00006:yttfy19_ge_un_ha_tw_
sa_c58_q11_vi1_ad_ar&sc=:so:tw:pay::rc_emmk190514p00006:yttfy19_ge_un_ha_tw_sa_c58_q11_vi1
_ad_ar&pcode=emmk190514p00006?bcid=5858503130001&shareURL=http (last visited Mar. 31,
2022).
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Oracle Products, ORACLE, https://www.oracle.com/products/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).
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Id.
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Oracle Artificial Intelligence (AI), ORACLE, https://www.oracle.com/artificial-intelligence/ (last visited
Mar. 31, 2022). Oracle helps enterprises build intelligent systems utilizing pre-built artificial intelligence
to automate their operations, promote innovation, and securely make smarter decisions through
elimination of human error and better business insights. Id.
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Oracle Data Science Platform, ORACLE, https://www.oracle.com/data-science/ (last visited Mar. 31,
2022). Oracle employs artificial intelligence and experts to help build data science platforms within their
businesses to promote unparalleled productivity. Id. This improved data collection and integration
recommends the best business algorithms and aids in machine learning and data processing. Id. See also
Oracle Big Data, ORACLE, https://www.oracle.com/big-data/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2022) (explaining how
Oracle’s big data services help businesses and professionals catalog and process large quantities of raw
data).
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In order to further develop its strength in the cloud computing and data science fields,
Oracle (joined by Walmart) entered into a partnership with rapidly-growing social media app
TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, in September of 2020.159 Through the deal, Oracle
became a 12.5% owner of TikTok Global and TikTok announced that the company selected
Oracle as their “secure cloud technology provider.” 160 Oracle benefits from this partnership in
two key ways: first, TikTok making the move to Oracle’s cloud computing space will likely
boost the tech company’s presence and promote competition with other cloud computing giants
like Amazon, Microsoft, and Google; and second, Oracle’s tech platform includes ad tech and
marketing tech products with tools for analyzing audiences and the success of ad campaigns, so
TikTok’s wealth of user data might solve the problem and provide better data to marketers using
the platform.161
Oracle Corporation began as “Software Development Laboratories” in 1977, when Bob
Miner and Larry Ellison founded it. 162 Their goal was to develop a relational database model
designed to organize large quantities of data “in a way that allowed for efficient storage and
quick retrieval.”163 In 1979, Oracle was released as “the earliest commercial relational database

159
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2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/oracle-tiktok-both-stand-to-benefit-from-partnership-2020-9.
See also Deborah Hellinger, Oracle Chosen as TikTok’s Secure Cloud Provider, ORACLE (Sept. 19,
2020), https://www.oracle.com/news/announcement/oracle-chosen-as-tiktok-secure-cloud-provider091920.html.
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Mark Hall, Oracle Corporation, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oracle-Corporation
(last visited Mar. 31, 2022). Oracle went by “Software Development Laboratories” from 1977–79,
“Relational Software Inc.” from 1979–82, and “Oracle Systems Corporation” from 1982–95, when it
became “Oracle Corporation.” Id.
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program to use Structured Query Language (SQL), and it quickly became popular.” 164 Oracle
became known for aggressive marketing and innovation, and in 1987 it became the biggest
database management company globally. 165 A majority of Oracle’s growth “has come through its
aggressive acquisitions of software companies with products for a range of business and
technology applications,” and among the scores of companies bought by Oracle were PeopleSoft,
Sun Microsystems, and NetSuite. 166
Oracle has developed into an industry-leading powerhouse providing both software and
information management services globally for decades.167 “Oracle technology can be found in
nearly every industry and in the data centers of 98 of the Fortune 100 companies.” 168 Today, it is
“the world’s second-largest independent software company.”169
V.

WHY ARE ORACLE AND AMAZON DIFFERENT FROM FIRMS THAT
ANTITRUST LAWS WERE DESIGNED TO REGULATE?

This article asserts that antitrust laws are not sufficient to handle modern-day big
technology companies, which are distinguishable from the firms that antitrust laws were
designed to mitigate in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Technology companies like Amazon have
business models which allow them to attain monopoly status, domineer marketplaces, and
undercut competitors while simultaneously catering to consumer welfare by keeping prices low
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and increasing convenience for consumers. This is possible primarily because, unlike firms like
A&P and Microsoft (as recently as the 1990s), modern-day technology companies are able to
make income through selling user data to third parties170 and advertising on web and app-based
platforms.171 In other words, the consumers themselves are the money-makers, so the tech
companies can keep costs to consumers low (or free, in the case of websites like Google and
Facebook) while still achieving a monopoly dominance and undercutting smaller businesses.
Such monetization methods did not exist in the late 1800s and early 1900s, and lawmakers more
than one hundred years ago could not have fathomed something like today’s modern technology.
Thus, antitrust laws should adapt as the businesses they regulate continue to advance.
VI.

AMAZON CASE STUDY

Amazon likely could be held liable for antitrust violations under two out of the three
antitrust theories presented in this article. Under the traditional antitrust theory, Amazon likely
would not be considered a monopoly engaging in anticompetitive practices because its practices
benefit consumers. Under the hipster antitrust theory, Amazon would be considered a monopoly
engaging in anticompetitive practices because, though Amazon’s low prices benefit consumers,
it engages in traditionally anticompetitive practices to the detriment of other businesses. Lastly,
under the proposed antitrust theory, Amazon would likely be considered a monopoly engaging in
anticompetitive practices because it engages in predatory pricing and single firm conduct, which
squashes out competitors and causes harm to small businesses.
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See How The Big Five Tech Companies Make Money, Visualized, supra note 25.
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a. TRADITIONAL ANTITRUST THEORY
Traditional antitrust theory would likely not deem Amazon an impermissible monopoly
employing unfair business practices. The FTC evaluates monopolies using a two-step inquiry:
first, it asks whether the firm has “monopoly power” in a marketplace, which “requires [an] indepth study of the products sold by the leading firm” as well as alternative sources of products
which consumers would use if the dominant company raised prices; second, it investigates
whether the company used improper conduct to attain a leading position. 172
In evaluating whether a company qualifies as a monopoly, courts will apply the rules for
single firm conduct, even if a company has not become a literal monopoly, as long as the firm
has “significant and durable market power” or “the long term ability to raise price or exclude
competitors.”173 Courts will often not find monopoly power unless a firm or group of firms
acting in concert make more than 50% of product or service sales in a single geographic area.174
Further, the firm must be able to sustain this monopolizing position over time, such that no new
company could enter the picture and discipline the company’s conduct. 175 Here, Amazon has
significant and durable market power because it controls around 50% of the online retail sales in
the United States and it has maintained its role as a prominent online retailer for decades. 176
Further, Amazon has gone beyond online retail and has delved into other industries like grocery
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Thomas, Reagan, Watch Out Retailers. This Is Just How Big Amazon Is Becoming, CNBC (July 13,
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/12/amazon-to-take-almost-50-percent-of-us-e-commerce-marketby-years-end.html (stating Amazon was expected to control around 50% of the United States e-commerce
market in 2018).
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stores, technological devices, and more. 177 Indeed, it is hard to fathom a company with the power
to enter the market and discipline Amazon’s conduct. Thus, it likely is a literal monopoly with
the long-term ability to raise prices or exclude competitors.
Improper conduct analysis requires an in-depth analysis of the marketplace and the
method engaged to achieve and maintain a monopoly.178 “Obtaining a monopoly by superior
products, innovation, or business acumen is legal; however, the same result achieved by
exclusionary or predatory acts may raise antitrust concerns.”179 Such tactics may include tying,
predatory pricing, exclusive supply or purchase agreements, and refusal to deal. 180 A monopolist
may prevent other businesses from succeeding in the marketplace due to a legitimate business
justification, like if the monopolist competes in a way that benefits consumers by presenting
unique products and services or promoting greater efficiency. 181 Here, Amazon prevents other
businesses from succeeding because it has dominated the marketplace and keeps its prices lower
than its competitors.182 Further, Amazon often acquires competitors. Thus, it prevents other
businesses from succeeding in the marketplace. Nonetheless, Amazon probably has a legitimate
business justification to prevent other businesses from succeeding because Amazon benefits
consumers through presenting unique products and lowering price while increasing efficiency.
There is no evidence that Amazon refuses to deal with other companies, nor that the company
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uses exclusive supply and purchase agreements. It is possible Amazon utilizes predatory pricing,
but the standard for predatory pricing is very high and rarely evaluated or enforced.
“Generally, low prices benefit consumers. Consumers are harmed only if below-cost
pricing allows a dominant competitor to knock its rivals out of the market and then raise prices to
above-market levels for a substantial time.”183 The decision to keep prices at a level below its
own expenses not only does not harm competition but rather may be an example of thriving and
vigorous competition within the marketplace. 184 In spite of the FTC reviewing predatory pricing
claims, courts generally view predatory pricing claims with great skepticism.185 Some fear
Amazon heads toward predatory pricing—the company has maintained low costs and
hemorrhaged money for many years now and as a result has grown expansively. 186 The company
may eventually raise its prices once it has spread its reach far enough and stamped out alternative
options for consumers.187 The FTC (or the courts) cannot hold Amazon liable for predatory
pricing currently because the company has not raised its prices and has given no indication that
they intend to raise prices. Thus, the predatory pricing improper business practice could become
relevant at some point, but the allegations currently remain insufficient to subject Amazon to
antitrust litigation.
Thus, under the traditional antitrust framework, Amazon has not violated antitrust
regulations and therefore is not subject to enforcement by the courts or the FTC.
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b. HIPSTER ANTITRUST THEORY
Under hipster antitrust theory, Amazon would likely qualify as a monopoly employing
anticompetitive practices. Khan and other hipster antitrust theorists suggest two potential
alternative antitrust regimes to the current theories: first, stepping back and returning to
traditional antitrust principles from prior to the 1970s to prevent the emergence of dominance
and/or limit the scope of such dominance; or second, adopt regulations neutering a firm’s ability
to exploit its superior position while taking advantage of economies of scale through “applying
common carrier obligations and duties.”188 Under both alternative antitrust regimes suggested by
Khan, Amazon’s current practices would be subject to regulation. 189
i. KHAN’S FIRST SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANTITRUST
THEORY
Under Khan’s first suggested alternative antitrust theory, the predatory pricing doctrine
would be revised to abandon the recoupment requirement and focus instead on whether the
pricing is below cost. 190 Amazon is famous for its low prices and, under the hipster antitrust
theory, it would likely rise to the level of predatory pricing because the firm has deliberately kept
its prices low with the intent to continue expanding aggressively into multiple business lines. 191
Amazon has consistently deeply cut prices and invested instead in growing its operations,
foregoing profits in favor of growth, which undercuts the premise that predatory pricing is
irrational because firms tend to emphasize profits rather than growth. 192 This behavior under the
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hipster antitrust theory, without the influence of the recoupment requirement, would squarely
qualify as anticompetitive behavior.
Additionally, under the first suggested alternative antitrust theory, the issue of vertical
integration giving rise to anticompetitive conflicts of interest should be addressed through either
scrutinizing and preventing mergers or placing a prophylactic ban giving rise to any mergers that
would create a conflict of interest. 193 In either scenario, Amazon’s consistent behavior engaging
in mergers and acquiring smaller companies would violate this portion of the hipster antitrust
theory. For example, Amazon acquired Whole foods through a merger, allowing Amazon to
increase its dominance in the world of grocery shopping, which Amazon has a hand in already
both via the internet (where groceries may be purchased and shipped) and in Amazon’s own
grocery store locations.194 Khan’s regulations would prevent similar future acquisitions.
ii. KHAN’S SECOND SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANTITRUST
THEORY
Under the second suggestion, Khan recommends treating the dominant platforms as
monopolies and regulating them accordingly through accepting the benefits of the monopoly and
limiting how the monopoly may use its power—as is often the model for public utility
regulations and common carrier duties.195 Since Amazon serves as a form of essential
infrastructure in the internet economy, the elements of public utility regulations could be applied:
“(1) requiring nondiscrimination in price and service, (2) setting limits on rate-setting, and (3)
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imposing capitalization and investment requirements.”196 Under this theory, the FTC would treat
Amazon as a monopoly and regulate it in the way it can use its power—in the same manner as a
public utility.197 In particular, the nondiscrimination component would come into play and limit
Amazon’s future activity in terms of price and service to prevent future anticompetitive
behaviors.198 As it exists now, Amazon would likely violate these requirements as the company
remains largely unregulated.199
Thus, under either of Khan’s proposed alternative antitrust theories, Amazon would not
be able to continue as it is now without committing antitrust violations.200
c.

PROPOSED ANTITRUST THEORY

This article’s proposed antitrust solution has two components. First, it proposes an
adaptation of today’s laws to focus not only on consumer welfare but also on the welfare of
small businesses within the marketplace. This shift would allow for consideration of how the
monopolistic actions of these massive companies impact the small businesses forced to work
with and through them and encourage a healthy marketplace. Second, it proposes developing a
greater focus on predatory pricing. It also suggests, rather than only occasionally examining such
issues, lowering the bar for predatory pricing, so pricing tactics may be examined prior to prices
being raised to preemptively address predatory pricing tactics before they result in harm to
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consumers. Aside from these two changes, the analysis will be similar to the traditional antitrust
analysis presented above.
Amazon likely qualifies as a monopoly because it has significant and durable market
power, and it controls around fifty percent of the online retail sales in the United States.201
Amazon has maintained its role as a prominent online retailer for decades. 202 Further, Amazon
has entered into more areas than just online retail and has also delved into other industries like
grocery stores, technological devices, and more.203 Thus, it likely is a literal monopoly with the
long-term ability to raise prices or exclude competitors.204 Further, it is hard to fathom a
company with the power to enter the market and discipline Amazon’s conduct. 205 Thus, because
Amazon is a monopoly, the second part of the analysis—investigating whether Amazon employs
improper conduct—applies.
Amazon prevents other businesses from succeeding because it dominates the marketplace
and keeps its prices lower than its competitors.206 Further, Amazon often acquires competitors. 207
Under traditional antitrust theory, Amazon has a legitimate business justification for these
practices because the resulting low prices and convenience benefits consumers. However, under
the proposed alternative antitrust framework, the focus is not just on whether Amazon’s conduct
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benefits consumers but also on whether it benefits small businesses engaging in the
marketplace.208 An argument could be made that Amazon’s practices promote competition and
innovation, and that it supports small businesses through allowing them to sell their products on
the Amazon website. 209 However, because Amazon both owns the retail platform and competes
on the platform, it has the ability to price its own items below those of its competitors and allows
Amazon to gather valuable data about its competitors. These practices likely do not benefit small
businesses. In fact, many of Amazon’s business practices probably hurt small businesses.
There is no evidence that Amazon refuses to deal with other companies, nor that the
company uses exclusive supply and purchase agreements. However, under the proposed antitrust
framework, it is likely that Amazon is engaging in predatory pricing. Amazon has consistently
kept its prices lower than those of its competitors while continuously expanding the company
into new areas.210 Much of the time, this low pricing has resulted in Amazon hemorrhaging
money.211 Amazon has begun to make up ground in this area through entering more
marketplaces, which has been lucrative. However, Amazon has not yet raised prices as critics
fear it will.212 Nonetheless, cutting costs to maintain prices below competitors, to undercut
competition, has resulted in the elimination of most of Amazon’s competitors and has allowed
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Amazon to acquire a massive share of the online retail industry. 213 Though Amazon has yet to
substantially raise its prices, that is not to say that it has not yet raised prices at all; in 2018,
Amazon hiked the yearly price of Amazon Prime to $119/year from $99/year. 214 Thus, under the
proposed alternative antitrust framework, antitrust enforcers should critically examine Amazon’s
price-cutting behavior now rather than wait for the company to raise prices later.
Thus, under the proposed antitrust framework, Amazon has violated antitrust regulations
and therefore would be subject to enforcement by the courts or the FTC.
VII.

ORACLE CASE STUDY

Oracle would likely not be held liable for antitrust violations under any of the three
antitrust frameworks. Under the traditional antitrust theory, the FTC would not consider Oracle
a monopoly because it does not dominate a sufficient portion of the marketplace; and if the FTC
considered it to be a monopoly, the FTC would not consider Oracle as anticompetitive because
its low costs and network of resources benefit consumers. Under the hipster antitrust theory,
Oracle would likely not be considered a monopoly and therefore not subject to antitrust scrutiny
because it does not dominate enough of the marketplace; however, if it were considered a
monopoly it would still not violate antitrust regulations because it has not employed anticompetitive practices like predatory pricing, single firm conduct, or refusal to deal. Under the
final theory, Oracle would not be considered a monopoly due to its lack of market dominance;
however, if it were considered a monopoly, it has likely not engaged in any anticompetitive
practices like price fixing, and there does not seem to be evidence that Oracle’s practices have
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harmed small businesses. Thus, Oracle would not be subject to antitrust scrutiny under any
antitrust theory’s framework.
a. TRADITIONAL ANTITRUST THEORY
Under traditional antitrust theory, it is unlikely Oracle would be considered an
impermissible monopoly employing unfair business practices. The FTC evaluates monopolies
using a two-step inquiry: first, it asks whether the firm has “monopoly power” in a marketplace,
which “requires [an] in-depth study of the products sold by the leading firm” as well as
alternative sources of products which consumers would use if prices were raised by the dominant
company. Second, they investigate whether the firm used improper conduct to attain a leading
position.215
In evaluating whether a company qualifies as a monopoly, courts will apply the rules for
single firm conduct, even if a company has not become a literal monopoly, as long as the firm
has “significant and durable market power” or “the long term ability to raise price or exclude
competitors.”216 Courts will often not find monopoly power, unless the firm, or group of firms
acting in concert, has made more than 50% of the product or service sales in a single geographic
area.217 Further, this monopolizing position must be sustainable over time, such that no new
company could enter the picture and discipline the company’s conduct. 218 Oracle likely does not
have significant and durable market power because its primary industry, cloud computing, is
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dominated by its competitor, Amazon. 219 Additionally, though Oracle has acquired TikTok and
thereby has expanded its data and data analytics power, it likely still does not dominate enough
of this marketplace to be considered a monopoly. 220 Further, competitors like Amazon could
discipline its conduct. Thus, it is unlikely Oracle is a literal monopoly with the long-term ability
to raise prices or exclude competitors.
However, if Oracle were considered a monopoly, then investigators must determine
whether the company has engaged in improper conduct. 221 Improper conduct analysis requires an
in-depth analysis of the marketplace and the method engaged to achieve and maintain a
monopoly.222 “Obtaining a monopoly by superior products, innovation, or business acumen is
legal; however, the same result achieved by exclusionary or predatory acts may raise antitrust
concerns.”223 Such tactics may include tying, predatory pricing, exclusive supply or purchase
agreements, and refusal to deal.224 A monopolist may prevent other businesses from succeeding
in the marketplace due to a legitimate business justification, like if the monopolist competes in a
way that benefits consumers by presenting unique products and services or promoting greater
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efficiency.225 Oracle might prevent other businesses from succeeding because it has created a
substantial presence in the cloud computing and data science fields and it keeps its prices
competitive with its competitors. 226 Further, Oracle is known for acquiring its competitors and
using these acquisitions to develop previously underdeveloped areas of the company. 227 Thus, it
might prevent other businesses from succeeding in the marketplace by buying those who
compete against them and increasing their suite such that consumers will not look to smaller
competitors for their products.228 Nonetheless, Oracle probably has a legitimate business
justification to prevent other businesses from succeeding because it benefits consumers through
presenting unique products and lowering price while increasing efficiency. 229 No evidence was
found that Oracle refuses to deal with other companies, nor that the company uses exclusive
supply and purchase agreements.230 Further, there is no evidence of predatory pricing.231
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Thus, Oracle has not violated antitrust regulations under the traditional antitrust
framework and therefore is not subject to enforcement by the courts or the FTC.
b. HIPSTER ANTITRUST THEORY
Under hipster antitrust theory, it is unlikely Oracle would be considered an impermissible
monopoly employing unfair business practices. 232 Khan and other hipster antitrust theorists
suggest two potential alternative antitrust regimes to the current theories: first, stepping back and
returning to traditional antitrust principles from prior to the 1970s to prevent the emergence of
dominance and/or limit the scope of such dominance, or second, adopt regulations neutering a
firm’s ability to exploit its superior position while taking advantage of economies of scale
through “applying common carrier obligations and duties.”233 Under both alternative antitrust
regimes suggested by Khan, Oracle’s current practices would probably not be subject to
regulation.
i. KHAN’S FIRST SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANTITRUST
THEORY
Under Khan’s first suggested alternative antitrust theory, predatory pricing doctrine
would be revised to abandon the recoupment requirement and focus instead on whether the
pricing is below cost. 234 Oracle does not seem to employ predatory pricing as a tactic because its
rates are comparable to the rates of other, similarly situated businesses.235
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Under the first suggested alternative antitrust theory, the issue of vertical integration
giving rise to anticompetitive conflicts of interest should be addressed through either scrutinizing
and preventing mergers or placing a “prophylactic ban on mergers that would give rise to
conflicts of interest.”236 Oracle has acquired several notable businesses over the past decade
which, under the hipster antitrust model, might be subject to regulation or at least scrutiny.
Among these notable acquisitions are NetSuite, Peoplesoft, and BEA Systems. 237 Additionally,
Oracle recently partnered with ByteDance in a merger in which Oracle acquired partial
ownership of popular social media and data collection app, TikTok. 238 All of these merges and
acquisitions might raise questions about vertical integration under Khan’s model and thus would
likely be subject to scrutiny or perhaps a future prophylactic ban on such mergers. For now,
however, the mergers likely would not violate Khan’s model because they have not risen to the
level of firms like Amazon as addressed in Khan’s article.
ii. KHAN’S SECOND SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANTITRUST
THEORY
Under the second suggestion, Khan recommends treating the dominant platforms as
monopolies and regulating them accordingly by accepting the monopoly's benefits and simply
limiting how the monopoly may use its power. 239 This approach would mirror that already
adopted with public utility regulations and common carrier duties.240 As Oracle serves as a form
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of infrastructure in the internet economy (particularly in the realm of cloud computing and data
science), the elements of public utility regulations could be applied: “(1) requiring
nondiscrimination in price and service, (2) setting limits on rate-setting, and (3) imposing
capitalization and investment requirements.”241 Under this theory, if Oracle rose to the level of a
monopoly it would be treated as such and regulated in the way it can use its power in the same
manner as a public utility.242 However, Oracle does not currently rise to the level of a monopoly
and thus would not fall under this model of regulation.243
c.

PROPOSED ANTITRUST THEORY

This article suggests an adaptation of today’s laws to center around both consumer
welfare and the welfare of small businesses in the United States. Second, this article asserts that
developing a greater focus on predatory pricing and lowering the bar for predatory pricing so
pricing tactics may be examined before they result in harm to consumers will allow small
businesses to thrive in the United States.
Oracle is likely not a monopoly because, although it has significant and durable market
power, it has not acquired enough market power in any particular industry to be considered a
monopoly.244 Oracle’s biggest industry is cloud computing, an industry in which it is
overshadowed by Amazon’s cloud computing platform, Amazon Web Services. 245 Oracle’s
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acquisition of Tiktok has created an interesting turn of events in terms of Oracle’s work in the
data science industry. However, Oracle has still not risen to the level of comprising 50% or more
of the market and thus it will not qualify as a monopoly.246 If Oracle were to be considered a
monopoly, however, an analysis of whether Oracle engaged in improper business practices
would be necessary.
Oracle prevents other businesses from succeeding because it often purchases its
competitors and uses their practices to improve itself and expand into other areas of the tech
industry.247 Oracle also maintains competitive prices and does little to promote small businesses
or encourage competition.248 Thus, in contemplating whether Oracle’s practices benefit small
businesses, it is likely Oracle’s practices not only do not benefit small businesses, but in fact,
harms them by inhibiting their ability to succeed in the marketplace.
However, there is no evidence that Oracle engages in improper business tactics. There is
no evidence that Oracle refuses to deal with other companies; nor that the company uses
exclusive supply and purchase agreements. Oracle also does not employ predatory pricing or
tying.
Thus, under the proposed antitrust framework, Oracle has not violated antitrust
regulations and therefore neither the court nor the FTC could subject them to enforcement.
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VIII. THE FUTURE OF BIG TECH AND ANTITRUST LAW
The technology and online retail industries will continue to grow as technology becomes
more prevalent in everyday life.249 Increasing dependence on the few large companies that
dominate this marketplace means these companies will continue to grow , and antitrust issues
will remain a concern. 250 It is not a mystery why the past five years have wrought more antitrust
inquiry than usual and why the subject increasingly becomes front-page news; the problem is
growing bigger every year.251 At some point, the United States will need to either decide that
these practices are okay and allow big tech companies to dominate, or decide that they are not
okay—at which point it would need to adjust regulations to address the issues, which current
antitrust laws make next-to impossible.252
Some legal experts wonder if antitrust law is up to the task of regulating big tech
companies in the first place; should the FTC consider a new framework of regulation? 253
Currently, antitrust regulation proceeds at a leisurely rate in the court system. 254 Given the rapid
pace of change in the technology industry, the United States’ regulatory industry must respond

249

See Steve Lohr, Forget Antitrust Laws. To Limit Tech, Some Say a New Regulator Is Needed, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/22/technology/antitrust-laws-tech-newregulator.html.
250

See id.

See Eavis & Lohr, supra note 1. “The growing importance of cloud computing, the digital engine
rooms of the modern economy, shows how tech firms are building on their dominance.” Id.; see also
Kang, McCabe, & Wakabyashi, supra note 101 (discussing the FTC’s new focus on big tech companies);
cf. Myers, supra note 14 (alleging Amazon does not have an antitrust problem).
251

252

See Khan, supra note 7 (arguing antitrust laws need to be revised); cf. Ceccio & Mufarrige, supra note
14 (arguing antitrust laws do not need to be revised).
253

Lohr, supra note 249.

254

Id.

92

far more rapidly.255 Legal and economic specialists have suggested a potential solution: “a
specialist regulator . . . [focusing] on . . . major tech companies. It would establish and enforce a
set of basic rules of conduct, [including] not allowing the companies to favor their own services,
exclude competitors[,] or acquire emerging rivals and require them to permit competitors access
to their platforms . . . .”256 This “digital markets unit” concept has already been implemented in
the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and Australia, and would likely be its own agency or a
“digital division” within the Federal Trade Commission.257 This system would not be unheard of
since the United States has many regulators specialized to monitor specific industries. 258 Still,
legal scholars have critiqued this approach because the increased regulation might be “‘an
innovation killer’.”259
One possible solution would be for the FTC to adopt the hipster antitrust theory to shift
the focus of antitrust regulation away from harm to consumers and instead to businesses’
anticompetitive practices, as the old framework did. 260 The FTC is not opposed to considering
these theories, and the agency even hired Lina M. Khan as an advisor in its antitrust policy
reform discussions in 2018.261 Still, four years later, they have not adjusted their policies. It is
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possible the FTC is in the process of formulating a new proposition for antitrust regulation which
will serve as a hybrid between traditional and hipster regulation.
The FTC could also choose to maintain the status quo. Neither Congress nor the FTC
have made efforts to substantially change antitrust regulation since the 1970s. The FTC brought
the most recent successful, big antitrust lawsuit against Microsoft in the 1990s, but since then the
government has done very little in the way of antitrust regulation and enforcement. 262 In 2021,
the Department of Justice filed the biggest antitrust lawsuit since Microsoft against Google for its
search engine dominance. 263 Additionally, in December of 2020, the FTC filed a lawsuit against
Facebook for anticompetitive conduct, including anticompetitive acquisitions and
anticompetitive platform conduct. 264 These lawsuits might mark a shift in the interpretation of
traditional antitrust laws, and it is possible that these actions will resolve some of the issues with
antitrust regulations, or perhaps create a new approach to analyzing antitrust with big tech
companies. Still, courts will take years to resolve these lawsuits. At which point, where will the
big tech companies be?
Thus, the future of antitrust law is an enigma certain to breed substantial controversy in
the coming years unless the FTC makes substantial regulatory changes.
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IX.

CONCLUSION

Systematic and thorough revision of the existing antitrust regulatory framework is
necessary to ensure a healthy, competitive marketplace and to prevent big technology companies
from dominating the technology and online retail industries. As it stands now, antitrust
regulation has failed to prevent large tech companies from acquiring dominant, monopolistic
positions within their industries through anticompetitive practices. Google controls an estimated
eighty percent of search engine usage in the United States. Amazon commands close to half the
online retail market and expands to more and more industries every year. Even Oracle, though it
does not raise antitrust concerns currently, continues to grow in influence through the acquisition
of smaller companies to help expand the services it provides and control of every side of the
cloud computing and data analytics industries. If left unchecked, these big tech companies could
continue to expand until they are full monopolies. If this occurs, breaking them up to comply
with antitrust regulations may have far greater negative societal impact due to increased societal
reliance upon them.
Traditional antitrust theory is not sufficient to handle these challenges. The future of
antitrust law is uncertain, and whether the government will revise existing laws, employ new
laws, revert to old laws, or create an entirely new set of non-antitrust regulations dedicated to
regulating technology companies remains uncertain. Each potential solution presents a cascade
of problems, and officials need to balance the need for free and unregulated competition, which
promotes innovation, with the need to promote an industry where more than a few businesses can
succeed in order to create a thriving marketplace of ideas.
This article asserts that an appropriate solution to the problem would be to revise antitrust
laws to focus on harm to small businesses in addition–or as an alternative–to harm to consumers
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as the bar for anticompetitive practices. Further, this article suggests a revision to the predatory
pricing rules to allow for investigation and enforcement when companies use low prices to
eliminate competition rather than waiting for the companies to kill off their competition and then
raise prices later. This proactive rather than reactionary approach will yield far better results
without drastically changing antitrust law.
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